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Abstract: Malicious users try to compromise systems using new 
techniques. One of the recent techniques used by the attacker is to 
perform complex distributed attacks such as denial of service and to 
obtain   sensitive   data   such   as   password   information.   These 
compromised  machines  are  said  to  be  infected  with  malicious 
software   termed  a   “bot”.  In   this  paper,  we   investigate  the 
correlation of behavioural attributes such as keylogging and packet 
flooding  behaviour to detect  the existence of a single bot on 
a compromised machine by applying (1) Spearman’s rank 
correlation (SRC) algorithm and (2) the Dendritic Cell Algorithm 
(DCA). We also compare the output results generated from these 
two methods to the detection of a single bot. The results show that 
the DCA has a better performance in detecting malicious activities. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Computer systems and networks come under frequent attack 
from a diverse set of malicious programs and activity such as 
viruses  and  worms  [10].    The  detection  of  such  threat  is 
improving  in  the  area  of  network  and  computer  security. 
Recently, a new threat has emerged in the form of the botnet. 
Botnets, which are groups of distributed  bots, are controlled 
remotely by a central commander, termed the “botmaster”. A 
single bot, a term derived from robot, is a malicious piece of 
software  which,   when   installed   on  a  compromised   host, 
transforms  host   into   a  zombie   machine. This   zombie 
machine is remotely controlled by the attacker. 
Bots  use  different  types  of  networking  protocols  for  the 
communication  component  of  their  Command  and  Control 
(C&C) structure  such as Internet  Relay  Chat  (IRC),  HTTP 
and more recently  Peer-to-Peer  (P2P).   In this research  we 
are primarily  interested  in the  detection  of bots  which  use 
IRC protocol as they appear to be highly prevalent within the 
botnet   community. IRC  [17]  is  a  chat  based   protocol 
consisting of various  “channels” to which a user of the IRC 
network  can  connect.    The  attacker  programs  his  bots  to 
connect to  the  IRC  server  and  joins  the  specified  channel 
waiting for his commands.   Once the attacker joins the same 
channel,   he   starts   to   issue   various   commands   and   all 
available bots  on  that  channel  respond  to these  commands 
through C&C structure.   In early implementations, bots were 
used to perform distributed denial of services attacks (DDoS) 
using a flood of TCP SYN, UDP or ICMP “ping” packets in 
an attempt to overload  the capacity of computing resources. 
Recent  bots  are  developed  complete  with  advance  features 
such  as  keylogging  for  closely  monitoring  user  behaviour 
including   the   interception    of    sensitive    data    such    as 
passwords,  monitoring   mouse   clicks   and   the   taking   of 
screenshots  of  secure  websites.   Many Anti-Virus packages 
cannot  detect  a stealthy  keylogging  activity  on the system. 
The user has no way to determine if his machine is running a 
keylogger, therefore,  he could easily become a victim of the 
identity theft. 
Many  existing  botnet/bot  techniques  use  different  types  of 
signatures-based  detection  by  analysing  network  traffic  in 
order  to  detect  botnets  as  in  [6][9][20].    These  detection 
techniques  can  be   evaded   by  either   changing   the  bot’s 
signatures or encrypting  the  bot’s traffic  when 
communicating  with  the  attacker.    In  addition,  a  bot  can 
connect to  non-standard  ports  to  make  the  detection  more 
difficult.    Rather  than  detecting  botnet  by  monitoring  and 
analysing network  traffic  looking  for  bots’  signatures,  our 
work focuses on the detection of a single bot formulated as a 
host-based   intrusion   detection   problem,   and   avoid   the 
technical   problems   of   administrating   a   highly   infective 
network within an academic  environment.   To perform  this 
research,  we  rely  on  principles   of   “extrusion  detection” 
where  we  do  not  attempt  to  prevent  the  bot  from  gaining 
access to the system, but we detect it as it attempts to operate 
and  subvert   the  infected  host. This  procedure  involves 
monitoring  different  bot’s  behaviours  within specified  time 
window   such   as   potential   keylogging   activity   and   fast 
reaction to the received network information. 
In order to detect the bot on the infected machine, correlating 
bots’  behavioural   attributes   is   needed.   The   concept   of 
correlation  attributes within specified time-window increases 
the level  of malicious  behaviour activities  as depending on 
one  process  attribute  may  generate  large  number  of  false 
alarms.    This  is also lead  to the challenge  of choosing  the 
right correlation algorithm  which  enhances  the  detection  of 
malicious program. 
In    previous    work   [2][3],   we   introduce    two    different 
algorithms to correlate  the behaviour  of the  bot running on 
the infected system.   In this work, we compare and evaluate 
the  performance  of  the  two  correlation  algorithms  on  bot 
detection, including  Spearman’s  rank correlation  (SRC) and 
the DCA.   The  SRC algorithm  examines the correlation of 
different   processes   behaviours    by   monitoring   specified 
function  calls  executed  by  running  processes  on  a  single 
machine. DCA   has   been   applied   to   many   problems 
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particularly   in  the  area  of  intrusion  detection  in  computer 
security.   The DCA is a more intelligent  way of fusing and 
correlating information from disparate sources.  The immune 
inspired  DCA  implemented  by  Greensmith  et  at.  [12]  is 
based on an abstract model of the behaviour of dendritic cells 
(DCs) [22]. These  cells  are  the  natural  intrusion  detection 
agents of the human body, which activate the immune system 
in response to the detection of damage to host tissues.  As an 
algorithm, the DCA performs  multi-sensor data fusion on a 
set of input “signals”, and this information is correlated with 
potentially   anomalous   “suspect   entities”   which   we   term 
“antigen”. This  results  in information  which  will  state  not 
only if an  anomaly  is  detected,  but  in  addition  the  culprit 
responsible  for  the  anomaly.   Given   the  success   of  this 
algorithm at detecting scanning activity in computer networks 
as  in [13][14],  we will examine  the  DCA  as a solution  to 
correlate  different  behaviours  of a single  bot  running  on a 
machine. 
The   aim   of   this   paper   is   to   investigate   the   effect  of 
correlating   bot’s   behavioural   attributes   by   applying   two 
specified  correlation algorithms  to the  detection  of a single 
bot. For  these  experiments  the  basis  of  classification   is 
facilitated through the correlation of different activities such 
as  keystrokes  interception,  how  fast  the  program  executes 
certain  communication  function  calls  and  how  fast  is  the 
program react when receiving information. Our results show 
that  correlating  behaviours  exhibited  by  a  single  bot  can 
enhance the detection of malicious processes on the system to 
determine the presence of a bot infection and to identify the 
processes involved in the bot’s actions. 
This  paper  is  structured  as  follows:  Section  two  discusses 
existing bot  detection  techniques.    Section  three  describes 
detection methods that are used to detect a single bot on the 
system.   We present  our  methodology of bot detection  and 
explain  the  conducted  experiments   in  section  four. Our 
results  and  analysis  are  presented  in  section  five  and  we 
summarize and conclude in section six. 
 
2.  Related Work 
 
Existing research conducted in bot detection concentrates  on 
detecting  botnets  rather  than  an  individual  bot  as noted  by 
[1][7][8].   The  majority  of  these  techniques  use  signature- 
based approaches for botnet detection  by analysing network 
traffic  looking  for  well  know  signatures. Although  this 
approach is a useful mechanism for bot detection, it is limited 
if the network packet data is encrypted. 
Previous  work  presented  by Barford  [4]  represents  a  good 
introduction  to understanding  and  analysing  the  behaviours 
of bots.  Freiling et al. [8] collect bot binaries by using a non- 
productive  resource  (honeypot), to  analyse  bot  traffic  and 
infiltrate botnet by emulating bot activities. 
Cooke  et  al.  [7]  performs  bot  detection  through  payload 
analysis using pattern matching of known bot commands and 
in addition  examines  a  system  for  evidence  of non-human 
characteristics.  While  they  suggested  that  correlating  data 
from different  sources  would be beneficial  for the detection 
of a single  bot,  they did  not provide  information  regarding 
how this correlation should be performed.   Goebel and Holz 
[9] monitor and classify IRC traffic based on suspicious IRC 
nicknames, IRC servers and non-standard  server ports using 
regular expressions. 
Anomaly detection  plays an important  rule on  detecting the 
presence  of  a  bot  [5],  where  deviations  from  a  defined 
“normal”  are   classed   as   an  anomaly.   An  approach   for 
detecting  bots  using  behavioural   analysis  is  presented  by 
Racine   [19]   which   classifies   inactive   clients   and   their 
subsequent assignment to a network connection. 
Gu el at. introduce  the BotHunter  [15], which examines the 
behaviour  history  of  each  distinct  host  to  find  correlated 
evidence of malware infection and the BotSniffer [16], which 
correlates   common   bot    activities    such   as   coordinated 
communication, propagation and attack in network traffic. 
In summary the majority of techniques for the detection of a 
single   bot   uses   signature-based   detection   by   analysing 
network  packets.  These  techniques  are  limited  in  case  if 
packet   streams   are   encrypted.   Current   behaviour-based 
approaches  are  also  limited,  generating  high  rates  of  false 
positives, which have the potential to slow down or denial of 
service   a   system.   We   believe   that   correlating   relevant 
behavioural  attributes   with  programs   potentially   involved 
with a bot infection can enhance the detection mechanism. 
 
3.  Bot Detection Methods 
 
Existing  research  techniques  detect  the presence  of bots via 
network monitoring and analysis.   Rather than attempting to 
detect  bots   via  network   analysis,   our   work  focuses   on 
detecting   an   individual   bot   running   on   a   machine   by 
monitoring and correlating different activities on the system. 
In this section, we will describe two algorithms which apply 
correlation  techniques  to detect  abnormal  behaviour  in our 
system. 
 
3.1 Spearman’s Rank Correlation - SRC 
The  Spearman’s  rank correlation  (SRC)  algorithm  to  detect 
the bot is described in Algorithm 1. 
 
S1: keystrokes interception 
S2: how fast the bot responds to attacker 
commands 
S3: how fast the bot repeats the same 
communication function calls 
 
if (KeyboardState function(s) is executed /* 
i.e. keylogging activity*/ ) 
{ 
if (SRC(S1,S3)>Threshold && SRC(S2,S3)>Threshold) 
{ 
Strong Detection 
} 
elseif (SRC(S1,S3)<Threshold && SRC(S2,S3)< 
Threshold) 
{ 
Weak Detection 
} 
elseif ((SRC(S1,S3)<Threshold && SRC(S2,S3)> 
Threshold) || (SRC(S1,S3)>Threshold && 
SRC(S2,S3)< Threshold)) 
{ 
Medium Detection 
} 
} 
else 
No detection and normal activity is 
considered 
end 
Algorithm 1. SRC Algorithm for detecting Bot. 
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SRC   is  a  statistical   measure  of  correlation   which   uses Signal Symbol Definitions 
threshold  function  to describe  the relationship  between  two   Name   
variables.   In order to detect a bot in a system, different bot 
behaviours are correlated to generate a high correlation value 
represented   by   SRC   value. Such   behaviours   include 
intercepting user keystrokes, how fast the bot responds to the 
attacker commands  and  how fast it executes  same  function 
calls.  In our case, if SRC value exceeds a certain threshold 
level, a high correlation between the two different behaviours 
is  generated.    According  to  SRC  algorithm,  the  threshold 
level of 0.5 or higher represents a strong correlation between 
two events. 
The  aim  of  SRC  experiments  is  to  verify  the  notion  that 
correlating different behaviours  of a single process indicates 
abnormal activity.   In addition, we apply the monitoring and 
correlation scheme to a normal application  to verify that the 
normal  application  behaves  differently  from  the  malicious 
process which  results  in having  different  correlation  value. 
The obtained results are compared with DCA results. 
 
3.2    The Dendritic Cell Algorithm - DCA 
 
3.2.1 Algorithm Overview 
Pathogen 
Associated 
Molecular 
Patterns 
Danger 
Signal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Safe 
Signal 
S1=PS A  strong  evidence  of  abnormal/bad 
behaviour.  An increase in this signal 
is  associated with a high  confidence 
of abnormality. 
S2=DS A  measure   of   an  attribute   which 
increases in value to indicate 
deviation from usual  behaviour. Low 
values  of  this   signal  may  not  be 
anomalous,   giving   a   high    value 
confidence of indicating  abnormality. 
S2   has less effect on the output 
signal than S1 signal. 
S3=SS A measure which increases  value in 
conjunction observed normal 
behaviour.  This  is  a  confident with 
indicator  of  normal,   predictable  or 
steady-state   system  behaviour.  This 
signal is used to counteract the effects 
of  S1     and  S2     signals  and  thus  
has negative impact on the output 
signals. 
Table 1. Signals Definition 
Artificial  Immune Systems (AIS) are algorithms  inspired by 
the behaviour  of the human immune system.  The biological 
immune  system  tries  to  protect  the  body  from  the  attack 
against any  invading pathogen,  viruses  and  bacterias.    AIS 
have  been  applied  to  problems  in  computer  security  since 
their initial development in the mid-1990’s. 
A  recent  addition  to  the  AIS  family  is  the  Dedritic  Cell 
Algorithm  (DCA)  implemented  by  Greensmith  et  al.  [2]. 
DCA is inspired by the function of the Dendritic Cells (DCs) 
of the  innate  immune  system  and  uses  principles  of a key 
novel  theory   in   immunology  termed   the   danger   theory 
described by  Matzinger  [18].   The  danger  theory  suggests 
that the DCs are the first line defense against invaders and the 
response is generated by the immune system upon the receipt 
of  molecular  information  which  indicates  the  presence  of 
stress or damage in the body.  The interested reader can refer 
to [11] for a detailed description of the DCA.  In this section 
we provide an overview of the operation of the algorithm. 
When  viewed  from  a  computational  prospective,  DCs  are 
anomaly  detector   agents,  which  are  responsible   for   data 
fusion and generating  appropriate actions in  response  to the 
attack in the human body.  In nature DCs exist in one of three 
states:   immature,   semi-mature   and   mature.   The   initial 
maturation   state   of  a  DC  is  immature  for  sensing   and 
processing three categories of input signals (see Table 1) and 
in response  produces  three  output  signals.   The  three  input 
signals can influence the behaviour of DCs sensitivity. 
The first two input signals are S1  and S2.  S1   signal is derived 
from the detection  of pathogens  while S2  signal is generated 
from the unexpected  cell death of damage to the tissue cells. 
While  in  immature  state,  DCs  capture  the  suspect  entities 
(termed   “antigen”)   and  combine   them  with   evidence  of 
damage in the form of signals  to provide  information about 
how  “dangerous”  a  particular  protein  is  to  the  host  body. 
Antigen collected by the semi-mature DCs are presented in a 
“safe” context  while  antigen  presented  by mature  DCs  are 
presented in a “dangerous” context. 
In  terms  of the  algorithm,  the  DCA  is a population  based 
algorithm which  performs  anomaly  detection  based  on  the 
indication of abnormality  of the system  by aggregating  and 
performing  asynchronous   correlation   of  signals   with  the 
suspects antigen.  Signal processing occurs within DCs of the 
immature  state.  Each  DC  in  the  immature  state  performs 
three functions as follows: 
•    To sample antigen by collecting antigen from an external 
source and transfers the antigen to its own antigen storage 
facility. 
•    To update  input signals in which the DC collects  values 
of all input signals present in the signal storage area. 
•    To  calculate  temporary  output  signal  values  from  the 
received input signals, with the output values then added 
to form the cell’s cumulative output signals. 
The  transformation  from  input  to  output  signal  per  cell  is 
performed    using   a   simple   weighted   sum   (Equation   1) 
described  in  detail  in [14]  with  the  corresponding  weights 
given in Table 2 (WS3).   These weights determine the value 
of the output and derived  from preliminary  observation  that 
defines the danger level of the input signals. 
 
 
3 
O L (1) The third input signal is S3   which is molecules released as a 
result   of  normal   cell  death. During   immature   lifespan 
collecting signals,  if the DC has collected  majority of S3, it 
will  change  state  to  a  semi-mature  state  and  suppress  the 
= 
i 
 
 
Where: 
i
∑ (W
ijk 
* S
i 
)
 ∀jk 
activation  of the immune system. Conversely,  cells  exposed 
to S1    and  S2    signals transforms  into a mature  state  and 
can instruct the immune system to activate. 
•    W is the signal weight of the category i 
•    i is the input signal category (S1=PS, S2=DS and S3=SS) 
•    k is the weight set index WSk   as shown in Table 2 (k =1 to 
 
 Signal WS1 WS2 WS3 WS4 WS5 
S1 2 4 4 2 8 
O1(csm) S2 1 2 2 1 4 
 S3 2 6 3 1.5 0.6 
 S1 0 0 0 0 0 
O2(semi) S2 0 0 0 0 0 
 S3 1 1 1 1 1 
 S1 2 8 8 8 16 
O3(mat) S2 1 4 4 4 8 
 S3 -3 -12 -6 -6 -1.2 
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5) 
•    Oj     is  the  output  concentrations  of one  of the  
following signal: 
•    j=1 costimulatory signal (csm) 
•    j=2 a semi-mature DC output signal (semi) 
•    j=3 mature DC output signal (mat) 
input: Sorted antigen and signals 
(S1=PS,S2=DS,S3=SS) 
output: Antigen and their context (0/1) 
 
Initilize DC; 
 
foreach cell in DC population 
{ 
while CSM output signal (O1) < migration 
threshold 
{ 
get antigen; 
store antigen; 
get signals; 
calculate interim output signals; 
update cumulative output signals; 
} 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Weight Sensitivity Analysis. 
 
 
In  the algorithm,  the signal  values  are assigned  real  valued 
numbers and the antigen are assigned as categorical values of 
the object to be classified.   The algorithm has three different 
stages, the  initialization  stage,  the  data  processing  and  the 
analysis  stage. In  the  initialization   stage,  the  algorithm 
generates  DCs  population  where  each  cell  is  assigned  a 
random  “migration”  threshold.    The  input  data  forms  the 
sorted antigen and signals (S1, S2    and S3) with respect to 
the 
cell location update to lymph node; 
 
if semi-mature output (O2) > mature output(O3) 
cell context is assigned as 0 ; 
else 
cell context is assigned as 1 ; 
 
kill cell; 
replace cell in population; 
} 
Algorithm 1. DCA Algorithm for detecting Bot. 
 
The  closer  this value is to one, the more  likely the  antigen 
type is to be anomalous.  A threshold is applied to distinguish 
between anomalous and normal type of antigen. 
 
 
Z 
MCAV    =    
x 
(2)
 
time and passed to the processing stage.   Each DC performs  x Y 
an  internal  correlation  between  signals  and  antigen  with x 
respect   to  a  specified   time   window   determined   by  the 
migration  threshold,   signals   and  antigen.   To  cease   data 
collection,  a  DC  must  have  experienced   signals,  and  in 
response to this express output signals.  As the level of input 
signal  experienced   increases,   the   probability   of  the  DC 
exceeding its  lifespan  also increases.    The  level  of  signal 
input is mapped as a cumulative O1   value. Once O1  exceeds 
a migration threshold  value, the cell ceases signal and 
antigen collection and is removed from the population and 
enters the maturation stage.  Upon removal from the 
population the cell is replaced by a new cell, to keep the 
population level static. 
A high concentration of S1  and S2   increases the probability 
of 
immature   cells   to   become   mature   cells   while   a   more 
concentration of S3     imposes the  immature  cells  to  become 
semi-mature cells.   Therefore,  if O2   > O3   , the DC is 
termed “semi-mature” cell.  Antigen presented by semi-mature 
cell is assigned a context value of zero.  In contrast, O2  < O3  
leads to 
a  “mature”  cell  and  antigen  presented  by  mature  cell  is 
Where MCAVx  is the MCAV coefficient  for antigen type x, 
Zx  is the number of mature context antigen presentations  for 
antigen type x and Yx is the total number of antigen presented 
for antigen type x. 
Previously  in  [11],  it has  been  shown that  the  MCAV  for 
processes   with  low  numbers  of  antigen  per  antigen  type 
generates false  positives  alarms.    In  order  to  reduce  these 
false alarms,  we introduced  an  anomaly  value  which  is an 
improvement on the MCAV, by incorporating the number of 
antigen  used  to  calculate  the MCAV.  This  improvement  is 
termed  the  MCAV  Antigen  Coefficient,   MAC.  The  MAC 
value is calculated from Equation 3 and also ranges between 
zero and one.  As with the MCAV, the closer the MAC value 
to one, the more anomalous the process. 
 
 
MCAV   * Antigen 
x x
 
assigned a context value of one.  The detection of anomaly is 
based on having more mature cells than semi-mature cells in 
which  the  antigen  in  a  mature  context  is  detected.  The 
pseudo code for the functioning of a single cell is presented in 
Algorithm 2. 
MAC    = 
x n 
∑ 
i = 1 
 
 
Antigen 
i 
(3) 
The  final  stage  involves calculating  an anomaly  coefficient 
per antigen type - termed  the mature  context  antigen  value, 
MCAV once all antigen and signals are processed by the cell 
population, an analysis stage is performed.   The derivation of 
the MCAV  per  antigen  type in the range  of zero  to one is 
shown in Equation 2. 
Where   MCAVx    is  the  MCAV  value  for  process  x   and 
Antigen  is the number of antigen processed by process x. 
x 
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4.  Methodology 
 
4.1    Overview 
For  the  purpose  of  experimentation  two  different  types  of 
bots are used, namely spybot [4] and sdbot [21].   These are 
suitable  candidate  bots  as  they  use  a  range  of  malicious 
functionalities   such  as  keylogging,  SYN  attack  and  UDP 
attack  which  are  frequently  used  features  by bots.  An IRC 
client (IceChat)  is used for normal conversation  and to send 
files to a remote  host  which  represents normal  traffic.   To 
provide suitable data a “hooking” program is implemented to 
capture  the  required  behavioural  attributes  by  intercepting 
specified function calls.  The collected data are processed by 
both   the  SRC   algorithm   and  the  DCA   to  measure  the 
detection performance. 
 
4.2    Bot Scenarios 
Three  different  scenarios  are constructed  including  inactive 
(E1),  attack  (E2.1-2.3)  and  normal  (E3)  scenarios.  The 
attack scenario consists of three sessions: a keylogging attack 
session,   a   flooding   session   and   a   combination   session 
comprising both keylogging and packet flooding. 
•    Inactive bot (E1): The bot on the infected host connects 
to an IRC server  and joins  a specified  channel  to await 
commands   from   its   controller,   though   no   attacking 
actions  are  performed  by  this  idle  bot.    Other  normal 
applications such  as  an  IRC  client,  Wordpad,  Notepad 
and terminal emulator (CMD) processes are also running 
on this host. 
•    Keylogging   Attack   (E2.1):   The   bot   is   capable   of 
intercepting   keystrokes   using   various   methods.   Two 
methods of keylogging are used including  the 
“GetKeyboardState” (E2.1.a) and   “GetAsyncKeyState” 
(E2.1.b)  function  calls.  However,  detection  cannot  be 
performed by  monitoring  these  function  calls  alone,  as 
some of  legitimate programs  often rely on such function 
calls. 
•    Flooding Attack (E2.2): This involves performing packet 
flooding using the spybot for a SYN flood attack (E2.2.a) 
and the sdbot for a UDP attack  (E2.2.b)  which emulate 
the  behaviour  of  a  machine  partaking  in  a  distributed 
denial of service attack. 
•    Combined Attack (E2.3): In this session, both keylogging 
and flooding attack (SYN flood  [E2.3.a] and UDP flood 
[E2.3.b])  are  invoked  by  the  bot.  Note  that  the  two 
activities can occur simultaneously in this scenario. 
•    Normal   Scenario   (E3):  This   involves  having   normal 
conversation between  the  two  parties.    It  also  includes 
transferring a  file  of  10  KB  from  one  host  to  another 
through IRC client.  Other applications such as Wordpad, 
Notepad, cmd and  the  hook program are running on the 
victim host.  Note that no bots are used in this scenario. 
 
4.3    Signals 
Three  signal  categories  are  used  to define  the  state  of  the 
system namely S1, S2  and S3   as described previously in 
Table 
1,  with  one  data  source  mapped  per  signal  category.    The 
mapping  of  raw  signals  to  signals  for  the   algorithm   is 
determined   via   expert   knowledge. These   signals   are 
collected  using  a  function  call  interception  program.  Raw 
data  from the monitored host are transformed  into log  files, 
following  a   signal   normalisation   process.   The   resultant 
normalised signals are in the range of 0 – 100. 
In terms of the signal category semantics, S1   (PS) is a strong 
evidence for bad behaviour  on a system.   Because we focus 
on  detecting   bots   performing   keystrokes   interception   in 
combination   with   other    malicious   activities,    we   have 
classified this activity as our S1.   This signal is derived from 
the rate  of  change  of  invocation  of  selected  API  function 
calls used for keylogging activity. Such function calls include 
GetAsyncKeyState,    GetKeyboardState,    GetKeyNameText 
and keybd_event when invoked by the running processes.  To 
use  this  data  stream  as  signal  input,  the  rate  values  are 
normalised.   For  this process  nps,  (ps is referred  to the PS 
signal), is defined as the maximum number of function calls 
generated by pressing a key within one second. 
S2  (DS) is derived from the time difference between receiving 
and sending  data  through  the  network  for  each  process  by 
intercepting  the  send()  and  recv()  function  calls.    Because 
bots respond  directly to  botmaster  commands, a small time 
difference between  sending  and receiving  data  is observed. 
In  contrast,  normal  chat  between  users  will  have  a  higher 
response time.   As  with  S1    signal,  the  normalisation  of S2 
involves calculating  a maximum value. For this purpose nds, 
(ds  is  referred   to  the  DS  signal),  is  the  maximum  time 
difference   between   sending   a   request   and   receiving   a 
feedback.   If the  time  difference  exceeds  nds,  the  response 
time is normal.   Otherwise, the response time falls within the 
abnormality range. 
We  set  up  a  critical  range  (0  to  nds)  that  represents  an 
abnormal response  time.   The zero  value  is mapped to 100 
max-danger time and nds   is mapped to zero min-danger time. 
If the response time  falls within the critical  value,  it means 
that the response is fast and considered to be dangerous. 
Finally,  S3   (SS) is derived  from the time difference between 
two outgoing  consecutive  communication  functions  such as 
[(send,send),(sendto,sendto),(socket,socket),(connect,connect 
].   This observation  is based  on bot sending  information to 
the botmaster or issues SYN or UDP attacks which generates 
many function calls within a short time period.  Therefore we 
set nss1  and  nss2     (ss is referred  to SS signal)  as a range of 
a time difference between  calling  two consecutive 
communication functions.   If the time difference is less than 
nss1, the time is classified within a min-safe time.   If the time 
difference falls between nss1   and nss2, the time is classified as 
uncertain time.   If the time  difference  is more than nss2, the 
time is classified as max-safe time. By recording the time that 
a bot  responds  to the command in most of the experiments 
that we have  conducted,  we notice  that the mean  value for 
bot  to  respond  to  the  command  is  around  3.226  seconds. 
Therefore, we set up a critical range for S3  signal.  We divide 
our critical  range  into  three  sub-ranges.    The  first range  is 
from zero to nss1  where nss1=5 to allow enough time for a bot 
to respond  to  the  attack’s  command.    Any value  that  falls 
within  this  range  is  considered  as  a  min-safe  time.    The 
second range is where there is uncertainty of response.   The 
uncertainty range  is  between  nss1     and  nss2     =20.    The  
third range  is   that   the   time   difference   is   above   nss2       
and   is considered as a max-safe time.  In this range, we are 
sure that the time difference between two consecutive 
function calls is 
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generated as a normal response. 
In case of S2  and S3  signals, this decision is based on that 
the attacker design  the bot to responds  to the  his/her 
command without adding a short random delay when 
responding to the commands or when flooding other hosts or 
network. 
 
4.4    Antigen 
For  the purpose  of bot  detection,  antigen  are derived  from 
API  function  calls,  which  are  similar  to  system  calls.  The 
resultant data is a stream of potential antigen suspects, which 
are correlated with    signals    through    the    processing 
mechanisms of the DC population. One constraint on antigen 
is that more than one of any antigen type must be used to be 
able to  perform  the anomaly  analysis  with the DCA.   This 
will allow for the detection of which type of function call is 
responsible for the changes in the observed input signals. 
The  collected  signals  are  a  reflection  of  the  status  of  the 
monitored system.   Therefore,  antigen  are  potential  culprits 
responsible  for  any  observed  changes  in  the  status  of  the 
system.    The  correlation  of  antigen  signals  is  required  to 
define which processes are active when the signal values are 
modified.   Any process  executed  a specified  function  calls, 
the process id which causes the calls is stored as an antigen in 
the antigen log file.   The more active  the process, the more 
antigen it generates.   Each intercepted  function call is stored 
and  is  assigned  the  value  of  the  process  ID  to  which  the 
function call belongs and the time at which it is invoked. 
For the SRC algorithm  experiments,  only the signals (S1,  S2, 
S3) log file is used to detect the malicious activities.   In case 
of DCA,  signal  and  antigen  logs  are  combined  and  sorted 
based on time.   The  combined  file forms a dataset  which is 
passed  to  the  DCA  through  a  data  processing  client.  The 
combined log files are parsed and the logged information  is 
sent to the DCA for processing and analysis. 
 
4.5    Data Collection 
A  bot  is  already  installed  on  the  victim  host,  through  an 
accidental “trojan horse” style infection mechanism and runs 
as a process whenever the user reboots the system. 
An  interception   program  is  implemented  and  run  on  the 
victim machine to collect the required data.  Two types of log 
files  are  produced,   SigLog  and   AntigLog. The  SigLog 
presents values S1,   S2   and S3   in the following format with 
an example below it: 
<time> < type > <S1> <S2> <S3> 
e.g. <0001> <signal> <11> <32> <89> 
The  AntigLog  presents  the  intercepted  API  function  calls 
with respect to its process ID (PID) in the following format 
with an example below it: 
<time> < type  > <PID> <Function call name> 
e.g. <0002> <antigen> <722> <GetAsyncKeyStat() > 
 
After finishing  the data  collection,  the SigLog  is  passed  to 
SRC algorithm for analysis.  In case of DCA, the SigLog and 
AntigLog are merged together and sorted with respect to the 
time  and  the  combined  file  is  passed  to  the  DCA  for  the 
analysis. 
Three  specific  types of function calls are intercepted.  These 
function calls are as follows: 
•    Communication  functions: socket,  connect, send, sendto, 
recv and recvfrom. 
•    File access functions: CreateFile, OpenFile, ReadFile and 
WriteFile. 
•    Keyboard   (Keys)   status   functions:   GetAsyncKeyState, 
GetKeyboardState, GetKeyNameText and keybd_event. 
The   communication  functions  are  used  because  the  bots 
needs to communicate with the botmaster in order to send or 
receive  information.    In  addition,  these  function  calls  are 
used in flooding attack.  The file access functions are needed 
because once a bot  intercept the user keystrokes, it needs to 
store the  intercepted  data  in a buffer  or in a file for future 
access.   The  keyboard  status  functions  are  needed  because 
many  existing  bots  implement  the  keystrokes  logging  by 
executing  these  functions  in  `user  mode'  level  in  windows 
environment. 
 
4.6    Experiments 
The aim of these experiments  is to evaluate the performance 
of  the  SRC  algorithm  and  the  DCA  on  detecting  the  bot 
running on the system.   Various  experiments  are conducted 
to verify  this  aim.   Each  experiment  is repeated  ten  times 
which   is   sufficient,   as   the   results   from   the   repeated 
experiments produce a small variation on standard deviation by  
using  Chebyshev’s  Inequality.    One  dataset  is  selected 
randomly from  each  repeated  experiments  and is passed  to 
both the SRC algorithm and the DCA.   Five null hypotheses 
are used for the evaluation as shown in next section. 
 
4.6.1 Null Hypotheses 
• Null  Hypothesis  One  (H1):  Data  collected  per  dataset 
are normally distributed.  The  Shaprio-Wilk  test is used 
for this assessment. 
• Null Hypothesis  Two (H2): The SRC algorithm is  able 
to detect the existence of bot when correlating different 
attributes. 
• Null Hypothesis  Three (H3): The DCA algorithm using 
the MCAV/MAC values for the normal processes are not 
statistically  different  from  those  produced  by  the  bot 
process. This  is verified  through  the  performance  of a 
two-sided Mann-Whitney test. 
• Null  Hypothesis   Four  (H4):   Variation   of  the   signal 
weights  in  DCA  algorithm   as  described   in  Table  2 
produces   no   observable   difference   in   the   resultant 
MCAV/MAC   values    and    the    detection    accuracy. 
Wilcoxon  signed   rank   tests   (two-sided)  are  used  to 
verify this hypothesis. 
• Null   Hypothesis   Five   (H5):   There   is  no   difference 
between  the  SRC   algorithm   and   DCA   in  terms   of 
performance on detecting bot. 
 
4.7    System Setup 
In all DCA experiments,  the parameters used are identical to 
those implemented in [14], with the exception of the weights. 
All experiments are performed in a small virtual IRC network 
on a VMware  workstation.    The  VMware  workstation  runs 
under a Windows XP P4 SP2 with 2.4 GHz processor.   The 
virtual  IRC  network  consists  of  two  machines,  one  IRC 
server  and  one  infected  host  machine.  Two  machines  are 
sufficient   to  perform   these   experiments   as  one   host   is 
required to be infected and the other to be an IRC server to 
issue  commands   to  the  bot  in  question.  The  statistical 
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analyses are performed using R statistical computing package 
(v.2.6.0). 
 
5.  Results and Analysis 
 
Upon the application of the Shapiro-Wilk  test to each of the 
datasets, the resultant p-values imply that the distribution  of 
the datasets is not normal. Therefore, the null hypothesis one 
(H1) is rejected. As a result of  this, further tests with these 
data use  non-parametric  statistical  tests  such  as the  Mann- 
Whitney test, also using 95% confidence. 
 
5.1    Spearman’s Rank Correlation - SRC 
Our   assumption   is   that   calling   GetAsyncKeyState()   or 
GetKeyboardState()    functions   by   an   unknown   running 
program  may  represent  abnormal  behaviour  in our  system. 
This is  because  many  of the  current  logging  techniques  in 
user-mode  level  in  windows  environment   use  these   two 
function calls to perform keylogging activities.  However, we 
consider that calling these functions generate only a “weak” 
alert  because  other  legitimate  programs  may use  the  same 
API  function  calls.    Therefore,  the  correlation  of  different 
types of  bot  behaviour  is needed  to  enhance  the  detection 
confidence to form a “strong” alert. 
In  our experiments,  we use the SRC  algorithm  to  correlate 
two different datasets.   The first dataset is PS and SS signals 
(S1,  S3) dataset while the second dataset is DS and SS signals 
(S2,  S3) dataset. In both datasets, we compare S1    and S2   
with S3   because  the existing  of  S3     suppresses  the effect  
of other two signals. 
We   analyse  the  results   of  the  experiments  described  in 
Section 4.2. Table 3 represents  the SRC  value between  the 
two datasets, (S1,  S3) and (S2,   S3), in each experiment.  In this 
table, we have two sets of results.   In set Set1, we correlate 
all the captured  data  from  our algorithm  including  the idle 
period.    In  this  period,  no  activity  is  seen,  therefore,  we 
assign a zero value to this period.  This is represented by (Z) 
columns.   In set Set2, we remove all the idle periods which 
have zeros (NZ columns) and apply the SRC algorithm to the 
new data.   The reason for having the two sets is that having 
the idle periods  in our data  increases  the correlation value. 
This is because  there  are many places  where  no activity  is 
noticed  in  both   datasets,   which  may  produce   inaccurate 
correlation.  Therefore, we wanted to investigate the effect of 
having no idle periods. 
The   Keylogging   Activity   column   represents  the   situation 
where  the  process  calls  any  function  used  to  intercept the 
keystrokes. As  a  result,  we  classify  our   API  detection 
confidence into three cases: 
•    Normal detection (Normal):   Keylogging  activity  is   not 
detected  and  either  low  or  high   correlation   value  is 
noticed. 
•    Weak detection (Weak):    Keylogging activity is detected 
but a low correlation is noticed in both datasets. 
•    Medium   detection   (Medium):   Keylogging   activity  is 
detected but a high correlation is noticed in one dataset. 
•    Strong detection (Strong): Keylogging activity is detected 
but a high correlation is noticed in both datasets. 
As mentioned in section 3.1, a high correlation is considered if 
the SRC value exceeds the threshold (0.5).  From Table 3, 
if we consider Set2, we see a high correlation value between 
(S1, S3) and (S2, S3) in experiment E1.  This is because the 
bot was  inactive  during  all  the  time  period.    The  only  
traffic generated  by   the   bot   is   the   PONG   message   to   
avoid disconnection   from    the   IRC   server.  Therefore,    
the correlation value is expected to be high as well. We 
consider this situation as a “normal” case. 
In experiment E2.1.a/b, the bot intercepts the user keystrokes 
and sends  the  data  to  the  botmaster.    As  a  result,  a  high 
correlation  value   is   expected   and   “strong”  detection   is 
generated. 
 
Exper- 
iment 
SRC(S1,S3) SRC(S2,S3) Keylog. 
Activities 
existence 
API 
Detection 
Confid. 
Set1 
(Z) 
Set2 
(NZ) 
Set1 
(Z) 
Set2 
(NZ) 
E1 0.98 0.72 0.96 0.87 No Normal 
E2.1.a 
E2.1.b 
0.61 
0.62 
0.85 
0.87 
0.74 
0.75 
0.69 
0.74 
Yes 
Yes 
Strong 
Strong 
E2.2.a 
E2.2.b 
0.64 
0.55 
0.51 
0.50 
0.60 
0.53 
0.59 
0.51 
No 
No 
Normal 
Normal 
E2.3.a 
E2.3.b 
0.11 
0.20 
0.17 
0.32 
0.50 
0.58 
0.52 
0.57 
Yes 
Yes 
Medium 
Medium 
E3 0.99 0.50 0.97 0.58 No Normal 
Table 3. The results of applying SRC on dataset signals (S1, 
S3) and (S2,  S3). 
 
 
In experiment E2.2.a/b, we notice a high correlation value on 
both datasets.  This situation is expected because the attacker 
issues a SYN attack and a UDP attack.  The bot responds by 
generating  a large  number  of same communication function 
calls for  a  long  period.  No  keylogging  activity  is detected 
during this period.   As a result, a “normal” case is indicated. 
This   situation   represents   the   false   negative   case   as   it 
incorrectly classified as normal. 
Experiment   E2.3.a/b   shows  a  combined   keylogging   and 
SYN/UDP attack activities.   The correlation value of (S1,  S3) 
is low compared to experiment E2.2.a/b.  This is because the 
bot is intercepting  keystrokes and performing  the SYN/UDP 
attack simultaneously.    As  a  result,  the  two  datasets  were 
noisy which generate a “medium” detection case. 
The  last  experiment  E3  shows  the  result  of applying  SRC 
algorithm on the IceChat client.  Even though we have a high 
correlation value before  and after  removing idle periods on 
both  experiments,  we did  not  detect  the  use of keylogging 
function calls.  Notice that we do not have a “weak” scenario 
in this case. 
In summary, we notice  that some experiments  produce  low 
correlation values.  There are many reasons for this.  The first 
reason  is  that   different   events   occur   in  different   time- 
windows.    As a  result,  SRC  algorithm  produces  inaccurate 
results.   The second  reason  is that some signals are varying 
differently influencing the correlation value.   Meanwhile, we 
have  many  idle   periods   in  our   datasets,   increasing   the 
correlation  value  which  affects  our  detection  scheme.    To 
improve this, we need to apply a more intelligent correlation 
scheme, as described in the next section. As a result, we can 
not  reject  or  accept  the  Null  Hypothesis  Two  (H2)  as  we 
need  a  strong  correlation  algorithm   to  perform   a  better 
indication of malicious behaviour. 
E1 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.14 
E2.1.a 0.10 0.20 0.47 0.55 0.76 
E2.1.b 0.38 0.41 0.54 0.59 0.80 
E2.2.a 0.55 0.31 0.60 0.93 0.93 
E2.2.b 0.30 0.18 0.43 0.59 0.94 
E2.3.a 0.88 0.63 0.82 0.91 0.99 
E2.3.b 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.99 
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5.2    DCA 
The results from the DCA experiments are shown in Table 3 
and Table 4.   The mean MCAV and the mean MAC values 
for each  process  are presented,  derived  across  the ten runs 
performed per scenario. 
 
Exper- 
iment 
Pro- 
cess 
Out- 
put 
Antgn 
mean Mann-Whitney 
(p-value) 
MCAV MAC MCAV MAC 
E1 Bot 
IRC 
35 
24 
0.0978 
0.0625 
0.0578 
0.0255 
 
0.1602 
 
0.0202 
E2.1.a Bot 
IRC 
1329.7 
59 
0.4736 
0.2881 
0.4542 
0.0122 
 
0.0002 
 
0.0002 
E2.1.b Bot 
IRC 
Cmd 
Note- 
pad 
Word- 
pad 
1296.2 
464.9 
8.9 
239.4 
 
268.8 
0.5441 
0.5284 
0.7889 
0.6916 
 
0.8286 
0.2098 
0.1077 
0.0031 
0.0726 
 
0.0977 
 
0.0089 
0.0002 
0.0002 
 
0.0002 
 
0.0002 
0.0002 
0.0002 
 
0.0002 
E2.2.a Bot 
IRC 
cmd 
19206 
18 
9.8 
0.6047 
0.3441 
0.2889 
0.6038 
0.0003 
0.0002 
 
0.0002 
0.0003 
 
0.0000 
0.0000 
E2.2.b Bot 
IRC 
5790.5 
19 
0.4360 
0.2772 
0.4346 
0.0009 
 
0.0002 
 
0.0000 
E2.3.a Bot 
IRC 
41456 
20.5 
0.8218 
0.5480 
0.8214 
0.0003 
 
0.0002 
 
0.0000 
E2.3.b Bot 
IRC 
Cmd 
Note- 
pad 
Word- 
pad 
22446 
59.1 
9.7 
23.1 
233.6 
0.9598 
0.7802 
0.6300 
1.0000 
 
0.8801 
0.9461 
0.0021 
0.0003 
0.0010 
 
0.0090 
 
0.0000 
0.0002 
0.0001 
 
0.0002 
 
0.0002 
0.0002 
0.0002 
 
0.0002 
E3 IRC 135.5 0.1136 0.1136 N/A N/A 
Table 4. The results of the MCAV/MAC values generated 
from DCA based on signal weights (WS3).  Values on bold 
font are not significant. 
 
 
For all scenarios E1-E3, a comparison is performed using the 
results generated for the bot versus all other normal processes 
within a particular session as shown in Table 4. In this table, 
the computed p-values using an unpaired Mann-Whitney  test 
are  presented,   with  those  results  deemed  not  statistically 
significant   marked   in  bold   font.   In  experiment   E1,   no 
significant   differences   is   noticed   between   the   resultant 
MCAV  values  for  the  inactive  bot  and  the  normal  IRC 
process,   and   so   for   this   particular   scenario   the   Null 
Hypothesis Three  (H3)  cannot  be rejected for the reason of 
having small number of antigen produced by both processes 
to give an accurate description of the state of the monitored 
host. This is supported by the fact that the MAC values differ 
significantly for this experiment.  This implies that the MAC 
is  a  useful  addition  to  the  analysis  as  it  allowed  for  the 
incorporation of  the  antigen  data,  which  can  influence  the 
interpretation of the results. 
Significant   differences   are   shown   by   the   low   p-values 
presented in Table 4 for experiments  E2.1.a  and E2.1.b  for 
both  the  MAC  and  MCAV  coefficient  values,  where  the 
sample  size  is  equal  to  ten.  The  differences   are  further 
pronounced  in  the  generation  of  the  MAC  values,  further 
supporting its  future  use  with  the  DCA.  We  can  conclude 
therefore, that  the  DCA  can  be  used  in  the  discrimination 
between normal and bot-directed processes and that the DCA 
is successful in detecting keylogging activities.   This trend is 
also  evident  for scenarios  E2.2.a/b and E2.3.a/b,  where the 
bot process MCAV and MAC values are consistently higher 
than  those   of   the   normal   processes,   IRC   and   notepad 
inclusive. This information  is also displayed in Figure 1 and 
Figure 2  respectively.    This  implies  that  in addition  to the 
detection   of   the   bot   itself   the   DCA   can   detect   the 
performance  of  outbound  scanning  activity.  Therefore  the 
Null  Hypothesis   Three   (H3)   can  be  rejected  as  in  the 
majority   of   cases   the   DCA   successfully   discriminates 
between normal and bot processes, with the exception of E1 
because of the extrusion approach that we are taking. 
 
 
Figure 1. The MCAV values of bot and IRC client generated 
by DCA based on the weights (WS3). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The MAC values of bot and IRC client generated 
by DCA based on the weights (WS3). 
 
 
Table  5  and  Table  6  include  the  results  of  the  sensitivity 
analysis on the weight values for the bot process. The aim of 
these experiments  is to examine the effect of varying weight 
signals  on  to  the  DCA  detection  performance.     Different 
values have  been  generated  randomly  to  see  the  effect  of 
increasing  or  decreasing  S1,     S2       and  S3     weight  signals  
for O1=csm, O2=semi-mature and O3=mature cell. 
 
  Experiment    WS1 WS2 WS3 WS4 WS5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Weight sensitivity analysis for the bot’s MCAV 
values. 
 
For example, in case of O1, we have increased and decreased 
 E1 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 
E2.1.a 0.09 0.19 0.45 0.52 0.73 
E2.1.b 0.22 0.23 0.31 0.33 0.46 
E2.2.a 0.55 0.31 0.60 0.92 0.93 
E2.2.b 0.29 0.18 0.43 0.58 0.94 
E2.3.a 0.88 0.63 0.82 0.91 0.99 
E2.3.b 0.94 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.97 
Performance Evaluation of DCA and SRC on a Single Bot Detection 
 
311 
 
the weight value of S1, S2  and S3  to the point that reaches 
the steady  state  where  further  increase  and  decrease  to  
these values  will  not  have  a  large  impact  on  the  
MCAV/MAC values. 
 
  Experiment    WS1 WS2 WS3 WS4 WS5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Weight sensitivity analysis for the bot’s MAC 
values. 
 
The values presented in Tables 5 and 6 are mean values taken 
across   the   ten   runs   per   session   (E1-E2).   An   arbitrary 
threshold is applied at 0.5; values above this threshold deem 
the  process  anomalous,  and  below  as  normal.  From  these 
data, it is shown that changing the weights used in the signal 
processing equation has significant effect on the performance 
of  the  system.  For  example,  in the case  of session  E2.1.a, 
weight set WS1   produces a MAC value of 0.09 for the bot 
yet produces a value of 0.73 for WS5.   This increase is 
likely to reduce the rate of false negatives.   To further 
explore  these effects, the resultant data are plotted  as 
boxplots as the data are not  normally  distributed.  To  assess  
the performance  of the   DCA   as   an   anomaly   detector   
the   results   for   the anomalous bot and the normal IRC 
client are shown for the purpose of comparison.  For these  
boxplots,  the central  line represents   the   median   value,    
with    the   drawn    boxes representing the interquartile 
ranges. 
In Figure 3 the median MCAV values are presented, derived 
per  session  across  the  ten  runs  performed  for  each  WS 
(n=50). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The mean MCAV values for the bot and IRC client 
generated by DCA using different signal weight values (WS1- 
WS3). 
 
For the bot process, the MCAV is low for session E1, in-line 
with previous  results.  For E1, variation  in the  weights does 
not influence  the  detection  results,  as  this  process  has low 
activity and therefore does not generate any great variation in 
the signals.    Therefore,  without  input  variation,  the  output 
does not vary in  response  to changing  the manner in which 
the input is processed.  This is also evident in Figure 4 when 
using the bot’s MAC values. 
 
 
Figure 4. The mean MAC values for the bot and IRC client 
generated by DCA using different signal weight values (WS1- 
WS3). 
 
For  all  other  sessions,  much  greater  variation  is  observed 
upon weight modification, as shown by the large interquartile 
ranges produced for both MCAV and MAC values of the bot 
processes.  While  the  similar  trends  are  shown  across  the 
sessions  in  the  MCAV  of  the  IRC  client,  differences  are 
evident for the  MAC value.  In Figure  4 (Bot’s  mean MAC 
values) it is evident that all sessions have low MACs for this 
process across  all weight sets. Therefore as the  weights  are 
modified,  there  is  a  greater  influence  on  the  anomalous 
processes than on the normal processes. Should the arbitrary 
threshold applied to the MAC values be set at 0.2 as opposed 
to 0.5, then the performance  of the DCA on botnet detection 
is good, producing low rates of false positives and high rates 
of true positives. 
Finally,  to  verify  these  findings  statistically,   each  set  of 
results  per  session  per  weight  are  compared  exhaustively 
using the non-parametric  Wilcoxon signed rank test. For each 
test performed  the resultant  p-value  is less than 0.001. This 
allows us to conclude that modification of the weights has a 
significant effect on the output of the DCA when applied to 
this  detection  problem,  and  leads  to  the  rejection  of  Null 
Hypothesis Four (H4). 
 
5.3    SRC Algorithm and the DCA Performance 
From the results obtained, even though that both  algorithms 
were able  to detect  the malicious  behaviours by correlating 
different  attributes,  we  notice  that  the  DCA  has  a  better 
performance over the SRC algorithm when detecting the bot 
by   reducing   the  number  of  false  alarms  and   classifying 
processes into  normal  and  malicious.    Therefore,  the  Null 
Hypothesis Five (H5) can be rejected. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
In  this  work,  we  try  to  evaluate  the  performance  of  two 
correlation   algorithms   on   bots   detection   by  correlating 
different activities which inhibits malicious behaviour.   After 
collecting  our  datasets,   we  pass  the  captured   data  to  a 
Spearman’s  rank  correlation   (SRC)  algorithm.  Although 
SRC algorithm is a simple method to examine the correlation 
level,   the    results    were    promising.  However,    some 
experiments show a low correlation values.   This is because 
different activities  occur  in  different  time-windows.    As  a 
result, high false negative values could be generated. 
We  applied  the  same  datasets  to  the  DCA  to  evaluate  its 
detection accuracy  and  performance  in  comparison  to SRC 
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by exploring  different  null hypotheses.   It is shown that the 
DCA is capable  of discriminating  between  bot and  normal 
processes on a host machine.  Additionally, the incorporation 
of the MAC value has  a significantly positive  effect on the 
results,  significantly reducing false positives. Finally, the 
modification  of  the  weights  used  in  the  signal  processing 
component  has  a  significant  effect  on  the  results  of  the 
algorithm.   In addition,  we noticed  that appropriate weights 
for  this  application  include  high  values  for  the  safe  signal 
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